

THE NEW CHALLENGES TO INTELLIGENCE

1. Strategic models and alter-globalization movements

The present tendency of strategic analysts is to alternate the focus of their observations, which shifts from the operative procedures and organizational structure of terrorism (Islamic, far left, far right, anarchic, ecoterrorist, separatist) to the need to underline the pervading action of organized crime before finally emphasizing the breaking points of critical information infrastructures. The point remains, however, that the worldwide achievement and consolidation of alter-globalization¹ movements must lead the main intelligence agencies to recognize the threats posed to national security determined by the explicitly antagonistic purposes of such movements, and more precisely, the resolute opposition of alter-globalization movements to neoliberal institutions, national and supranational military institutions, and liberal democracy as well.

To prove our assertion – the threats of the antagonism of alter-globalization movements – it will be sufficient to underline the political relevance of the mobilization against the enlargement of the military base in Vicenza. According to the sociologist Gianni Piazza: “the first demands of the No Dal Molin movement were focused primarily on the health and environmental issues raised by the increased pollution (air, water, noise, electromagnetic and radioactive pollution) that the enlargement of the American base would cause and secondarily on the negative economic impact such expansion would have on local businesses. The entry of other players in the protest network (environmental associations, pacifist movements, anarchic groups and even more radical opponents such as squatter groups and certain trade unions) widened the interpretative patterns to other themes ranging: from the rights of local communities to decide on the use of their territories to repudiation of war, the presence of US and NATO bases, and the militarization of the territory. The No Dal Molin movement goes beyond the *Nimby* principle² both because the players involved are not just local people (citizen committees) and include groups and associations with universalist identities (ecologists, trade unions, far left and extraparliamentary parties) and because the protesters’ concerns with local and global issues turn it into a NOPE mobilization with marked pacifist and antimilitarist features (local people do not want military bases in their own ‘backyards’ or in anyone else’s) that invests directly the national and supranational level of government”³. After identifying the reasons, no less important are the protests carried out by the society and antagonist movements: “No Dal Molin diversifies the protests: from the occupation of Vicenza’s railway station, to the permanent garrison in front of the disputed airport; from the sit-in in front of Montecitorio to the

¹ *Alter-globalisation*, not to be confused with ‘anti-globalisation’. Alter-globalisation proponents seek to change the apparent ‘neo-liberal’ agenda of pro-globalisation advocates. They seek to determine globalisation through the implementation of leftist ‘social justice’ policies, universal humanitarianism and respect for disenfranchised people based on wealth and/or culture.

² NIMBY is the acronym for Not In My Back Yard.

³ Francesca Longo – Antonello Mangano – Gianni Piazza – Pietro Saitta, *Come i problemi globali diventano locali*, Edizioni terrelibere.org, 2009.

organization of the national demonstration of February 17th, which involved around 200,000 people across the streets of Vicenza. (...) In the meantime, once the works of construction have begun, the mobilization goes on with many initiatives, among which the occupation of the prefecture (...), of the railway tracks, the occupation of the site of the civilian airport and the roadblocks”⁴. In a nutshell, quoting Piazza would be sufficient to emphasize the national and supranational impact of these demonstrations. On the Italian scene, Piazza observes: “The No Dal Molin mobilization hardly affected the national government at all, influencing the decision of the newborn Democratic Party to break its alliance with the far left wing (Sinistra Arcobaleno) at the latest political elections”⁵; and concerning the international front: “despite the change in US administration from Bush to Obama, American and Italian politics regarding Camp Ederle does not change, as recently stated by national security vice-president of the Congress, Loretta Sanchez: ‘We will discuss the Dal Molin case at the G8 as well, but (...) there will not be any reassessments. All the decisions have already been taken by both governments. The plan and the budget have been voted by the Congress’ (Mancassola in www.ilgiornaledivicenza.it 16/04/09). Nevertheless, the Vicenza protest is still affecting the decisions of the US government and bringing the Pentagon to considering the idea of moving the F16 based in Aviano (Udine) to Poland due to the increasing ‘hostility’ towards American installations which started with the extension of the base in Vicenza”⁶.

In other words, these movements have unquestionably carried out a real war against political, military and economic institutions, a war extremely different from the conventional type. In this regard, it is sufficient to mention the content distributed by organizations such as Pax Christi, Beati Costruttori di Pace, Ruckus Society, Centro Gandhi, Rete Lilliput, social forums, Attac, Disubbidienti, and others.

Furthermore, the crucial role played by lay and religious scholars in theorizing the alter-globalization movement and its antagonism should also be emphasized, and it is equally important to consider the institutional context in which these ideological directions have emerged and developed: educational institutions, high schools and universities. Understanding the structure – undoubtedly reticular and well-organized as has been amply demonstrated both in Arquilla and the sociology of social movements – of alter-globalization movements and the ways they perform their antagonism, implies from a strategic point of view a necessary semantic widening of the meaning of war and strategy in order to clearly understand the syntax of alter-globalization movements. In this sense, the definitions of **war** given by *Busetto* and *Mini* are extremely effective for our purposes. *Busetto* defines war as the contrast between organized human groups of variable duration in which opponents attempt to impose their will on one another; *Mini* defines it as a contrast of purposes between organizations that use any violent or coercive means to impose their interest. Regarding the notion of **strategy**, the vast definition given by the *Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage* says that the art and science of the development and usage of political, economic, psychological and military forces necessary both in times of peace and war to increase the chances of victory is appropriate and effective at the same because a wide range of actors can be included. From here,

⁴ Ibidem, pp. 24-25.

⁵ Ibidem, pp. 26-27.

⁶ Ibidem, pp. 27-30.

contemporary strategic literature lets us classify the nature of alter-globalization movements at least theoretically.

1a. The analysis of Vittorfranco Pisano

The analyses of Vittorfranco Pisano theoretically classify the versatility of new wars with the denomination of *low intensity non-conventional conflict*. This conflict arises when two or more players – whether they are states or not – want to achieve subversive or violent aims using neither the rules of representative democracy nor conventional war. Low intensity non-conventional conflict is carried out especially by subversive agitation, terrorism, onset, civil war, revolution, coup, the formation of illegal or semi-illegal networks and misinformation. In order to strategically classify antagonist movements, we will focus on subversive agitation, onset, the formation of illegal or semi-illegal networks, and misinformation.

Subversive agitation, carried out by individuals belonging to political parties or parliamentary and extraparliamentary movements, aims to achieve political, ideological or religious targets using misinformation, incitement to civil disobedience, passive resistance, occupation of buildings, criminal damage, infiltration in peaceful demonstrations and in national or non-national structures to exacerbate tension, in the end, to utilize means of communications for psychological warfare. The ideological context that feeds the subversive agitation can be inspired by Marxism, Leninism, anarchism, radical environmentalism, nationalism, theocracy, or the far right universe.

Onset can follow subversive agitation and implies partial or total control of territory or national resources through illegal political organizations and paramilitary forces. Onset obviously involves armed conflict and above all implies significant operational planning skills carried out by guerrilla warfare and civil war.

Formation of networks aims to affect nations and even world politics. The case studies suggested by Pisano include communist combatant parties, International Red Aid (*Soccorso Rosso*) multinational activities, assorted sympathy groups, ethnic groups, and radical religious congregations.

Misinformation falls into the far wider context of psychological war because its aim is to distort the report of the facts, fake relevant documents, use agents of influence, broadcast illegal news, and create border organizations. Its influence on public opinion – explains Pisano – can surely be dangerous.

In short, we can observe how the operative procedure of subversive agitation may apply to alter-globalization movements.

1b. The French strategic analysis

Regarding the meaning of *misinformation*, in particular, the considerations of the French strategist Loup Francart are very helpful in more clearly understanding the operative procedures of non-conventional conflict in the context of antagonist movements and maybe considered a key reading of the merely psychological dimension of antagonism.

In his essay *La Guerre du sense* (Economica, 2000), the French scholar contextualizes misinformation in the field of mass information and observes that it is carried out by several

individuals whose aims are propaganda and subversion. In particular, it points to detecting our weaknesses and our mistakes through proven manipulative techniques such as: 1) negotiation of information or part of it, 2) the denial of real information, 3) omission, 4) compression, 5) discrediting facts and/or intentions, and 6) accreditation of false information. *Propaganda* is closely related and aims to influence the masses by forcing them into a unitary vision of reality, and its primarily objective is to weaken the enemy and strengthen his own real or potential allies. Totalitarian propaganda has been particularly effective over the years because it has been able to create a new man, use specific topics (anti-Semitism, for instance), use semantic tools of extreme symbolic value (such as evocative symbols, slogans and passwords), and use manipulative techniques like simplification, implication, the frequent use of the authorities' logic, isolation of the enemy, and the creation of scapegoats. It is usually associated with *indoctrination* which affects habits and behavior in its attempt to impose its own view of the reality and impose psychological submission through ideology to create a new order through fierce proselytism with psychic and physical imprisonment as its final goal. *Propaganda* is followed by *subversion* conducted through specific stages: discontent crystallization, mass intimidation, and then mass agitation and finally militarization. If undoubtedly – says the author – subversion in its entirety is part of an indirect strategy – and is therefore the weapon of the weak – cultural subversion aims firstly to dissolve consent and social ties, destroying them morally and psychologically, and secondly aims to impose a new order on society. In a political context, subversion attempts to paralyze public life and become effective on a social level through the formation of armed groups constituted of parallel hierarchies with insurrection as its only purpose. Another important approach useful in understanding alter-globalization movements can be found in the considerations of *Christian Harbulot*, director of the **École du guerre économique** (EGE). The French school – which differs from the American and Chinese – uses the expression *cognitive war* to explain the polemical use of knowledge. Within a disciplinary profile, this covers psychology, sociology, linguistics and computer science, while within a historical profile, Sun Tzu, Mao, the Comintern, and Churchill can all be considered as important predecessors. Concerning modern theorists – in the French context – the analysts *Mucchielli* (with his essay *La Subversion*, CLC 1976), *Geré*, (with his volume *La Guerre Psychologique*, Economica, 1999) and of course *Harbulot* must be considered the most relevant. Nevertheless, from a historical point of view, the beginning of cognitive war can be traced back to the remarks made by Chassin, Blanc and especially Larechoy, Nemo and Trinquier, after the Indochina war and at the beginning of the Algerian war. As far as the doctrinal sphere of cognitive war is concerned, according to the interpretation given by Harbulot, it implies both psychological and information warfare, and therefore the planned and systematic use of intoxication, misinformation and propaganda, or in other words, the use of techniques aimed at discrediting the enemy and neutralizing him through informative manipulation. The use of information and media technology has unquestionably widened the effect and impact of cognitive war. Moreover, examples that dramatically illustrate the dynamics of cognitive war are provided by Harbulot in the anti-globalization movement – and especially in Attac and in the Porto Alegre Manifesto – in citizens associations, and in the unscrupulous and exploitable use of law. On this point, and extremely useful to our purposes, is the analysis of the renowned French organization Attac made by two well-known scholars of EGE, Lucas and Triffau. Apart from the historical origin of Attac – on which French scholars often focus – other elements that clearly emerge from the

analysis made by French analysts are fundamental in our context. First of all, Attac extended its antagonist action in a short period of time by pointing awareness to the tragic consequences of GMOs⁷, retirement funds, and the ultra-liberalistic economic politics of the WTO. Secondly, the alliance formed with trade unions, cultural and environmental associations to build a wide and dynamic network was made by considering the “gauche plurielle française” ideological nature of these associations. In this regard the French scholars observe – not without some pleasure – that a closer exam of the strategies “de cette association nous rappelle celles du Komintern”. In fact, the ideological background of the founders of Attac – Cassen and Ramonet in particular – has its roots in Marxism and allows Attac to combine the different souls of the French far left. Thirdly – observe ironically Lucas and Triffau – the addressees of Attac arguments, who are keen on rhetoric, are not economic experts but rather scholars without the necessary scientific skills and therefore easily prone to misinformation, and these people are asked to become the actors of a renewed democracy – participatory democracy – and a new anti-liberalistic globalization. Nowadays, Mucchielli’s subversion-related remark is a reading full of inspiration and topicality. In the author’s opinion, subversion was used during the Second World War as an auxiliary instrument of traditional war. Starting from the Algerian war – a revolutionary war – subversion has been contextualized in a well-defined theoretical and strategic framework, that of psychological warfare. This, in practice, overcomes the boundary between war and peace, and in other words provides one of the best examples of non-conventional war unrelated to the rules that govern international law. It is in some ways something of an immaterial war, elusive and susceptible to metamorphosis and incarnation. Unlike revolution, subversive action or simply subversion is part of a preliminary action in which a part of a minority aims to take power. As a general rule, subversive action tries to achieve three objectives: demoralize the nation and dissolve the groups it is made of, discredit authority, its defenders and officials, and finally neutralize the masses in order to ease the taking of power. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the achievement of these three targets is possible only through the use of media, because without the press, radio and television subversion would be helpless. The author then clearly and briefly analyzes the main features of the subversion purported objective. The nation is demoralized by the destruction of its values and the systematically spreading of doubt and suspicion on the defenders of its institutions; authority is discredited through systematic propaganda of widespread disrespect and mistrust. The neutralization of the masses is achieved by inhibiting the action of the masses and creating apathy. Identifying the techniques by which authority is discredited is extremely relevant to the author, and one of the most techniques most commonly adopted by subversive propaganda is to depict the power as inquisitorial and society as repressive. Particularly effective – suggests the author – is the subversive action of counter-power which from time to time depending on historical and political contexts – has changed through Black and student power.

1c. The Rand Corporation Analysis

⁷ Genetically Modified Organisms

A third approach that makes a very important contribution to strategic sciences are those by Arquilla and Ronfeldt. Together with Pisano's remarks, in fact, relevant is the idea of *netwar* used by the analysts of Rand Corporation in the essay: *Netwars: the future of Terror Crime and Militancy*. The term *netwar* refers to a non-conventional mode of conflict in which the actors or players use net-like forms of organizations, doctrines, strategies and the technology related to them and pertinent to the computer era. In particular, the players of these conflicts are widespread organizations constituted by small groups and individuals that communicate and organize according to a web-like organizational structure. It makes no difference whether the subjects of this organization are associations, NGOs, or social activists (anti-globalization or Zapatistas movements) that act without using violence or terroristic groups. Nevertheless – state the authors – the resulting conflict is determined by non-state actors and the effectiveness of these web-like structures depends on the technological, narrative (their mission), organizational, doctrinal level, and their integration, of course. Apart from the undoubtedly important technological dimension, key aspects include the level of cooperation between players and the way in which they interact, which according to the authors can be found in the *chain-like structure* (where every actor is related to the previous one and communication passes through intermediate knots), the *star-like structure* formed by a pivotal knot that constitutes a hub for the other connections, therefore allowing each knot to communicate directly with the central hub, and finally, the *net-like structure* in which each knot is connected to the others allowing a spread of non-hierarchical communication.

1d. Non-violent action and alter-globalization movements

In the context of non-conventional conflict, non-violent action constitutes a strategy of great importance (see the remarks by Gandhi, Capitini, and Lanza del Vasto in this regard). Operational syntax of non-violent action legitimately falls into the field of non-conventional conflict and therefore in the field of strategic studies, as has been amply proven by *Gene Sharp*, who recognizes the distinctly asymmetrical nature of non-violent action, acknowledging its affiliation with the remarks by *Liddel Hart* on indirect approach and guerrilla warfare. The approach of the American scholar represents a fourth interpretative approach which is useful in comprehending both the psychological and the merely operative dimensions of alter-globalization movements.

To clarify the nature of non-violent conflict, Sharp compares it with guerrilla warfare, especially on the psychological and organizational level. Analyzing the analogies between non-violent action and guerrilla warfare according to Sharp's thesis, the psychological profile of non-violent activists must have specific features: full confidence (in values and choices), courage (of their ideas and actions), ability, and persistence. The tasks of the activist leader – like the guerrilla leader – are creating the strategy and the tactics, negotiating with the enemy, encouraging his or her comrades, choosing the right moment, and keeping discipline. The technical and practical training of the activist is, in fact, decisive to the achievement of his aims. If the attrition of the enemy is one of the purposes of his actions, not only should he focus on the weaknesses (as in every conventional or non-conventional conflict), it will be necessary to aim at partial but well-strengthened victories. For this purpose, education and publications for the masses (in the field of psychological war) will promote the achievement of localized but strong victories (specifying that one of the most evident differences from guerrilla is the publication both of purposes and organization charts, whereas

secrecy is essential to guerrilla movements). To detect a common ground with the strategy of guerrilla, non-violent action should catch the enemy off guard or, to use Sharp's words, drive the enemy out of his territory. In order to do that, taking and keeping the initiative are priority aspects of non-violent action, and carrying out a clear line of command will ease the action. Using psychological war, the activist should try to determine or use events to stir up a scandal (with consequent indignation of the public opinion) of national or international range to weaken the enemy's psychological strengths. In order to weaken enemy strengths, using psychological war again, the activist should promote defection, internal division or mutiny in enemy lines. More generally speaking – as acknowledges Sharp – the final result will contribute to: 1) economically damaging the enemy; 2) creating disorder; 3) creating or increasing internal opposition. Also in the context of non-violent action, only three final options will be possible: a) total victory; b) total defeat or – in most cases – c) settlement. The extents in which non-violent action is effectively carried out according to Sharp are: I) protest and non-violent persuasion, II) social non-collaboration; III) economic non-collaboration; IV) political non-collaboration; V) non-violent intervention. It must be clarified that Sharp's review is extremely important to our purposes because it helps us to explain the meaning of non-conventional conflict. Here are the strategies for each area. Regarding the *first* field, the techniques used are as follows: public speech, opposition letters, subscription of public statements, slogans, banners, manifestos, flyers, brochures, books, newspapers, magazines, CDs, radio and television, groups of parliamentary pressure, picketing, counter-elections, exhibition of flags and pictures, symbolic demanding, disrespectful acts, vigil, assemblies and protest meetings, theatre and music shows. In the *second* field, Sharp includes social sabotage (general and selective), strike, civil disobedience, withdrawal from social institutions due to protests, non-collaboration, emigration due to protest. In the *third* field, the operative procedures are the following: refusal of tax payment, lockout, strike (due to protest, lightning, sympathy, work-to-rule and selective). In the *fourth* field, Sharp indicates the following non-violent acts: boycott against legislative organs, against election and departments, withdrawal from educational institutions, boycott against pro-government organizations, non-collaboration with police forces and military institutions, refusal to accept the orders of public officials, refusal to dissolve the existing institutions, popular disobedience, sit-down, refusal to cooperate with conscriptions and deportations, hiding, assuming false identities and mutiny. In the end, in the last field, the *fifth*, the author underlines the opportunity to act as follows: fast, action of non-violent harassment, sit-in, stand-in occupation, ride-in occupation, foray, non-violent occupation, creation of new social models, guerrilla theatre, alternative social institutions, selective patronage, and publication of top secret documents.

The preliminary preparation – to start the non-violent action – is not different from that of the guerrilla. First of all, we should illustrate the aim of a mobilization, and then gather information not only on the aspects of the problems to be faced but also on the actors and the enemy institutions. From an organizational point of view, a net-like structure or affinity groups will preferably be chosen, avoiding a hierarchical formation wherever possible. Regarding the symbolic field, the use of manifestos, t-shirts, asphalt mosaics, graffiti or fake first pages could be a good solution. For psychological war the creation of a website that helps alternative information is a crucial step, as is the creation of a press office. In this sense, media activity should be built around a few simple rules: a) news should be about current affairs; b) the news should be given a dramatic connotation; c) the

source to which dissent must be directed should be defined; d) the conditions required to create allies among culture, show business, politics, or religion should be provided to widen the significance of the message or its “bursting effect”, but e) conditions should be especially provided to a nationwide or international scandal. In the end, if a big demonstration takes place f) mobilization should have an efficient director and good logistics (especially in view of arranged or non-arranged fights with police or fast retreats). Generally speaking, disorientation and over-identification (theorized by Blisset) would be crucial elements. Concerning techniques in different contexts, in cyber-warfare the activist will use: 1) mail bombing; 2) net-strike; 3) alternative radio and web for alternative information and misinformation; 4) national and international links. On a logistic level, the subversive agitator will use: 1) collective management to subvert hierarchical structures; 2) the creation of alternative and independent spaces (e.g. self-managed social centers); 3) shake march, and 4) lie-in.

1e. The analysis of Sociology of social movements

Together with these approaches of strategic nature, an approach focused on the specific comprehension of antagonist movements has been developing in the field of sociology. The study of non-conventional conflict in the field of antagonist movements cannot disregard the extremely important results achieved by the sociology of social movements. To that end, apart from the disputes from sociological schools, we will consider the ideological approaches of **Donatella Della Porta**, **Fabio de Nardis** and, of course, **Charles Tilly** and **Sidney Tarrow** by ascribing merely descriptive-explanatory value. Before entering briefly into our closer examination of the single methodological approaches of the sociology of social movements, however, it should be underlined that the results achieved have been and are still used to legitimize the alter-globalization movements from political and cultural points of view (legitimizations similar to those by Toni Negri, Deleuze and Guattari).

In her essay *Movimenti Sociali*, Donatella Della Porta states that the historical background of today’s social movements can be traced back to the 60s, and notes that social movements have taken their anti-system and strong ideological stance from trade unions. Apart from the analyses by Offe and Melucci on the anti-progressive, participatory and decentralized nature of the movements, the author underlines that one of the main purposes of the movements was firstly to elaborate and secondly to carry out, a form of participatory democracy that provided an alternative to representative democracy. Even if a social movement cannot be defined in its entirety its main features can be outlined: a social movement is a system of non-formalized relations between individuals or groups who decide to form either a scattered and weakly connected network or a dense and closely integrated network. Movements obviously have a system of shared beliefs and operate within a given social context to create conflicts of political and cultural and promote and/or hinder social change. They are formed by representatives – mostly belonging to the middle class – and not by members as the structured organizations, representatives who have strategic and decisional skills. Movements represent from time to time an interpretative pattern, and assume a completely antagonistic position to the state on some occasions and one of realignment on others, or rather one of critical trust and inclusion according to which they are fully entitled as members of the system – and in the end of revitalization through which movements sign an agreement with the

political system in order to change it. With the purpose of strengthening their interpretative pattern or world vision, movements constitute ideologies, identities, symbols, reports, and organizational structures that can develop through networking, sympathy relations, and private links. Social movements interact, of course, through either competitive or non-competitive cooperation, through neutrality or sectarianism and their internal structure can be partitioned (like groups or cells), multi-headed (with many leaders who influence only a small number of members), and net-like (that is normally carried out among independent cells).

The coordination of these structures can take different forms: formalization, professionalization, internal differentiation, integration, local units, or umbrella organizations. When movements interact with the system, they can become bureaucratized and lose their antagonist value, radicalize through the use of occasional violence or urban guerrilla, or ultimately commercialize and become a part of the system they once hoped to defeat. The operative procedure or strategy through which movements carry out their protest – apart from non-conventional specific techniques – is inspired by number, damage to property and testimony logic through the use of non-violent action and civil disobedience. Their different strategies depend on the political context in which they act, of course. In fact – as explains Della Porta – a political system with high territorial decentralization in which judicial power has great independence and in which powers are well balanced offers good grounds for movements to carry out all the antagonist strategies useful in achieving their aims.

The sociological remark by **De Nardis** fits well in the Della Porta and Touraine methodological approach. In particular, De Nardis focuses on some thematic issues of greater interest to our research. The identity building process in social movements is an essential component of collective action because it determines an “Us” and a “Them” to contrast. Because of this dichotomy, antagonist subjects are required to propose alternative solutions to the dominant system, solutions that can be developed in social networks, which offer organizational structures of extreme importance for recruitment and fast and effective communication. Even if their configurations differ due to the aims they wish to achieve, well-defined typologies may be adopted: the wheel typology, in which all the actors apart from the leader are involved in a relation or clique typology, in which all the players act in a homogeneous and not very centralized organization, for example. The involvement that the movements demand of their activists may be inclusive if it allows them multiple affiliations, or exclusive if it imposes to strict discipline. According to Blumer, the phases through which movements activate are four in number: social turmoil, popular excitation, formalization, and institutionalization. The forms of the protests, according to Dalton, will develop in exact series: non-conventional but still legal protests, non-conventional and out of the legal context, such as boycott or disobedience protests, completely illegal but non-violent – for instance all-out strikes – and illegal and violent protest like urban guerrilla warfare. Regarding the non-repressive relation between the political class and social movements, the former could relate to the latter according a variable geometry availability studied by Shumaker: a formal availability prone to listen to the demands of the movements, a limited availability prone to include some important themes for the social movements, and lastly, a wide availability thanks to which some proposals made by the movement become law. Another aspect of great relevance – determined by globalization – is the transnationalization of social movements (studied by Tarrow and Dalla Porta)

that could proceed through diffusion – the Zapatista revolt and international solidarity thereby determined, for instance –, through domestication addressed to supranational subjects, or through externalization which involves supranational subjects but determines fallouts on a local level. The effectiveness or not of transnationalization depends on the effectiveness of the counter-information carried out by social movements, which could materialize in a strong attack on the official media or the entire system or in an adaptation to the system, according to which cooperation with the official media does not invalidate the value of the protest but rather contributes, on the contrary, to amplifying it and increasing its value in the end, in an alternative in which the movements build independent and alternative systems of communication (such as independent radios, websites). Websites – according to the analyses by Della Porta and Mosca – can allow movements to perform logistical and organizational, informative and cognitive, protesting and symbolic-expressive tasks that strengthen the social movement's identity

To be more precise and avoid misunderstanding, we will refrain from analyzing the work by **Tilly** and **Tarrow**, *Contentious Politics*, in detail and merely limit ourselves to explaining the thematic knots essential to understanding the dynamics of conflict in the context of social movements. The interpretation of the actions performed by the movements must be divided – from a methodological point of view – into an identification of the political players (political organizations and social movements), the political identities of the players, the themes and objects of the conflict between political systems and movements, the controversial performances or controversial repertoires (petitions, mobilization, etc.) and the institutions willing to ally with the movements. In terms of explanatory concepts, the locations of the conflict, the context in which it develops, the sequences of claiming or flows of conflicts, the results related to conflicts determined by social movements, and finally, the willingness of political systems to negotiate must all be identified. As regards mechanisms, “the events that sort the same effects in a wide range of circumstances”, these can be detected in the increase or not of the distinction among political actors, the identification of other political actors belonging to the same group, the certification or credibility given by an institution to the demands of the movements, the cooptation, defection or diffusion that is the extension of a conflicting performance from one site to another, the emulation of the controversial repertoires and the themes handled, the mediation among sites, the repression and finally, in the transfer of boundaries of transnationalization. Regarding the processes – “combinations and sequences of mechanisms which produce specific results” – these are detected in social appropriation or incorporation of pre-existing groups into wider networks, self-representation or public manifestation, collective action, the action coordinated by many actors on the same theme, the change of the scale in a geographic context, the commercialization, the competition among movements, the increase or decrease of the democratic factor by the political system in response to the claims of movements, the disenchantment, the escalation of conflicting repertoires, the creation of coalitions on one or more themes, the institutionalization of the movements or, on the contrary, in the contraposition of the movements with respect to the political system.

2. Antagonist subjects and ideological orientations

In the light of these contributions it is easier – thanks to the sophisticated methodological instrumentation presented in the first part of this essay – to detect the antagonist subjects and their ideological orientation.

The activists who coordinate and fuel the practice of non-conventional conflicts, work in the following fields, in fact: 1) NGOs; 2) trade unions; 3) parties; 4) collectives; 5) self-managed social centers and 6) religious movements (of monotheistic, polytheistic and new age inspiration). The age of the activists runs in the wider range of sixteen to seventy and from one end of the social spectrum to another: 1) Lumpenproletariat; 2) unemployed; 3) temporary workers; 4) public and private employees; 5) scholars; 6) students; 7) free-lancers, and, to lesser extent, 8) managers. Their ideological orientation is multiform and varied because it involves: a) *anarchy* (more precisely, anarchic individualism, anarchic communism, anarchic trade unions, anarchic-insurrectionalism, and eco-anarchism); b) *libertarianism*, and can be placed between anarchism and the neocommunist left; c) *communism*, and, more precisely, marxist-leninist, trotskyst, luxembourg and castroist; d) *feminism* (communist, anarchic and eco-feminist); e) *belonging to trade unions* (from extreme left to anarchic trade unions); f) *communism of catholic and third-world inspiration* present across the board but rooted in religious groups; g) new age and fundamentalist religion, and h) the *extra-parliamentary right* (including the French Nouvelle Droite and *naziskin/skinheads*). The motivations that inspire the antagonist movements range from relative, contained change to radical changes involving different 1) cultural; 2) psychological; 3) political; 4) social, and 5) economic fields.

3. Intelligence and counter-measures

In light of these considerations, the effective counter-measures must obviously be identified. The contributions from Nativi and Mini – after the G8 uprising in Genoa – are surely inspiring.

Andrea Nativi's remarks are particularly pertinent. According to the editor of *Rid*: “It is strange how the impending danger has been underestimated: Gothenburg, Nice and Prague were more than alarm bells. Still, the Black Blocs and similar enjoyed a surprise effect, there was no preparation with respect to the adopted techniques, with small groups, with local guides, communication system (cellular phones and internet) and motorized explorers, logistics, medical support, psyop structure and communication, that acted with the same techniques of urban guerrilla warfare, striking everywhere, and then moving to another place, dislocating and provoking police officers who charged at innocent demonstrators, trying in vain to stop the violent ones”⁸. To prevent these actions, the author proposes some measures that can be greatly shared: “since the anti-globalization guerrillas are well-known to the police, it should not be difficult to create an European-international database, to identify many dangerous people, infiltrate the organizations, and then, close to an event, proceed with preventive measures, such as forced collection of signatures, with controls at the boundaries and interruption of Shengen treaty. The units dedicated to this task should be chosen formations, professionals, real *élite* units”⁹. In fact – continues Nativi – “it is necessary to lead targeted actions, aimed to isolate, neutralize and arrest leaders and violent

⁸ Andrea Nativi, *Militari e poliziotti: le lezioni da imparare*, tratto da Limes, *L'Italia dopo Genova*, 2001, n. 4, p. 53.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 53.

protestors, without using only 'blind' charges, it is necessary to have a complete picture of the situation, fast deployed reserves, a higher mobility compared to the organized thugs. And it is important to note which results have been achieved by well trained troops as the airborne brigade Tuscania, used to public order operations in the Balkans, where demonstrators shoot regularly and snipers always lie in ambush"¹⁰. Concerning the operative counter-measures to use, direct energy systems, foam-glues, nets and electronic goads should be taken into consideration. Under the information profile, difficulties increase: "If we move to the field of public order, information managing is more difficult, because there are hundreds of journalists, photographers and cameras directly on the field ready to shoot and tell whatever they want, not always what really happens. But police troops have (or should have) equivalent or more documentation, have or be able to access hundreds of fixed and moving cameras, direct shooting in the hot spots, helicopters. Most of the collected material, depurated by elements covered by investigative discretion, should be wisely and fast broadcast. Not telling or telling badly and late can provoke a disaster if the reporters are faster and do a better close examination. And communication facilities that just work for press releases to present the results of routine activities are almost useless"¹¹. On the contrary – as Jean stated in the same issue of the magazine – alter-globalization members have demonstrated excellent skills in managing information.

Also important are the remarks by **Gen. Fabio Mini**: "the violent protest of the global system (in this case equal to terrorism) is radical but does not propose ideological or social alternative patterns. In reality, violent contestation and terrorism tend to create a contrast and destabilization, exploiting the fear of the system itself and using its own means, among which, first of all, the resources of information warfare, of symbol warfare and the technologies of the Web"¹². Once again the importance of information and misinformation control emerges; control which skillful use of communication instruments allows. Nevertheless, Mini does not forget to remark how the complex articulation of the alter-globalization movement can be the result of a subtle American manipulation: "Since Seattle, where anti-globalization began basically in protection of the special interests of US producers, the road of violent protest has become more impracticable and less controllable. Anti-globalization has become a new ideological tool, new both for those (Russian and Chinese included) who see the return of US imperialism of the 60s in the globalization and those who think, also in good faith, that individual welfare and environmental protection values should prevail over the logic of profit and the expansion of the market. In this concern, the Seattle front has technically broadened (through misinformation and counter-intelligence) and been used as a *Leitmotiv* for State propaganda in countries like Russia that currently feel left out or penalized in the distribution of the dividends of Capitalism. It is not to be excluded that beyond ideal support, by those countries politically antagonist towards the Western system, there could be material support, especially funds, specialized personnel, and training courses"¹³. Then, in light of these remarks, Mini proposes a series of preemptive measures of great interest: "that is why the preemptive and active intervention of intelligence and counter-intelligence troops with national and international

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 58.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 58.

¹² Fabio Mini, *Come vincere la guerra dei simboli*, tratto da Limes, *L'Italia dopo Genova*, 2001, n. 4, p. 37.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 37.

jurisdiction is necessary in controlling movements and mass demonstrations”¹⁴. In particular, Mini suggests an “intelligence organization oriented towards collaboration and international integration, the integration of police forces in normative and organized unitary context, the integration of police and intelligence forces in an operative unitary context, the constant and coordinated action of all national (Armed Forces) and local (city police, national guards, and voluntary organizations for the security) security forces in the active control of the territory, and a specialized use of troops in the prevention and control intervention, the pursuit of prevention, that involves a total change in approach toward crime and mass demonstration control (from crowds in stadiums to protest demonstrations). Of course, this implies the specialization of small units in crowd controlling techniques using monitoring technologies and early intervention, education and training of police troops in the means of symbol, psychological, and information warfare and the acquisition of technologically advanced means of crowd control: from audio and video systems to air and earth identification systems and the identification of violence and weapon focus, to physical and phlegmatic deterrents (high pressure hydrants, foam generators, chemical, tear, urticating and temporarily incapacitating agents) to non-lethal weapons”¹⁵.

In summary, using the remarks of Nativi and Mini, intelligence agencies should carry out proper counter-measures when facing these actors. Starting from the observation that the content and strategies of antagonist movement emerge very clearly from open sources (internet websites, periodic and aperiodic publications, essays, and so on), the best counter-measures would be: 1) improving (where extremely necessary) the intelligence and counter-intelligence apparatus that must be the first defensive line in any serious counter-measure program; 2) integration between police and intelligence; 3) widespread control of the territory through planned and permanent collaboration between military institutions and local police; 4) the creation of specialized forces able to move on different levels (psywarfare, informatics warfare and cyberwarfare) similar to Special Forces; 5) the use of non-lethal weapons against mass violence or small groups promoting violence; 6) the creation of an international database to interpolate data; 7) the creation of specific training centers which would collaborate with officials from the Defense and the Ministry of the Interior; 8) avoiding the organization of international events which give credibility to activists and to their motivations; 9) stimulating self discipline in the mass media (even through evident or concealed institutional pressure); 10) planning that dissolves the artificial distinction between homeland and foreign security that masks the global nature of non-conventional conflict; 11) intelligence control that moves on horizontal level and invests different social contexts; 12) contrasting actions kept in secrecy whenever necessary; 13) it would be fundamental to modify criminal law; 14) the use of misinformation and the infiltration of provocative agents for control and sabotage; 15) the control of funding sources and freezing when necessary; 16) the exploitation thanks to infiltrators of rivalries between similar organizations; 17) the creation of supranational alliances among intelligences to contrast potential national and international directors (such as the World Social Forum) and 18) the discretionary use of retaliation when necessary if unlikely when regeneration towards guerrilla or terrorism arises (such as the degeneration achieved by the

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 38.

¹⁵ Ibidem, pp. 38-39.

movements in the 60s or the protests in Seattle or the G8 in Genoa). The institutions involved in this massive offensive could use a whole set of counter-measures theorized and applied both by the American counter-insurgency school and by the French school of revolutionary warfare.

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(Translation by Martina Berno)

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